Two cognitive systems

 

I’m convinced that to some extent human beings can act in a rational, autonomous way. I have to acknowledge that this conviction is fragile, because my own experience in this is poor. Moreover the idea that human beings can act rationally and autonomously is not undisputed. Neurocognitive scientists stress that the margin of reason is very small. And I think they might be right.

Three centuries ago David Hume had pointed out that, ‘reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions’ (Hume, 1739). With this he tried to indicate that it is only our passions that really activate us. Reason can only facilitate us in the awareness and judgement of our passions. So, according to Hume, the urgency of our impulses can only partly be reduced or guided by reason.

I think Hume was right especially in this sense that rational arguments cannot beat passionate beliefs. For a believer rational arguments are primarily used to confirm and rationalize his underlying passions.

 

From nature, we are inclined to follow our passions and not our reason. We also follow the passions and believes of others. Besides that, much of our behaviour is provoked by sentiments towards others. Unconsciously we tend to imitate other’s facial expressions, gestures, postures and intonations. We are prompted to like, love, please, dislike, abhor, hate, impress, challenge, use and abuse others. Much of our action is a reaction to other people. Sometimes we even feel urged to resign to our fate, to fulfil expectations, to defy authority and to conform to general opinions.

 

The role of automated and unconscious mental processes appears to be predominant. Normal people, like you and me, are susceptible to a multitude of irrational thinking, like ‘priming, WYSIATI, narrow framing, the inside view or preference reversals’ (Kahneman, 2011).[1] 

Psychological research has shown blatantly that the majority of our behaviour is produced by unconscious mental processes. The core of our unconscious ‘System 1’ is our associative memory that ‘continuously constructs a coherent interpretation of what is going on in our world at any instant. […] When we think of ourselves, we identify with System 2, the conscious reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices and decides what to think about and what to do’.[2]

 

Neurological research seems to confirm the existence of two functionally different cognitive circuits as well (Goel & Dolan, 2003). All animal life is provided with an evolutionary old System 1. It consists of several autonomous and parallel functioning subsystems. System 1 is operating automatically and sheer effortless. The processing capacity of this system is nearly unlimited. It’s based on the long term neural plasticity and adaptability that organisms  demonstrate when interacting with their environment. 

 

Evolution has definitely left it’s imprints in System 1. It incorporates inborn features of intuition and specific expertise based on global neural learning abilities: how to survive – individually and collectively; how to survive in relation to the surrounding nature; how to profit from as well as to contribute to the homeostasis within the own biotope and within the whole biosphere? It seems as if all actors – including human consciousness – are aiming at enduring life in an unconscious and subtle way. Somewhere seems to be an invisible maestro who directs all organisms in an evolutionary, symphonic repertoire. Just as with a real symphony orchestra the musicians are subject of regulating emotions of harmony and beauty. What is adapted to the circumstances – what is persisting life – is experienced as satisfying. In human language this is reflected in the words ‘good’ and ‘beautiful’.

 

Only very recently in evolution System 2 emerged. It appears to be a typical human faculty. It offers the opportunity for abstract reasoning and hypothetical thinking. System 2 has a logical and semantic character. It is depending on deliberate control, which means in daily practice that the dominating System 1 functions must be oppressed to some extent. Fortunately System 1 is never completely silenced. System 2 avails itself from System 1 functions and it is in this close corporation that System 2 can be most effective.

One of the most irreverent issues is mental concentration. When the corporation between the two systems gets slightly unbalanced our thinking enters an almost uncontrolled stage of daydreaming. Association based on our autobiographical memory is combined with sheer uninterrupted inner talks and movies. The reality is replaced with repeated fantasies. The practical effectiveness of thinking is completely lost.

 

Thanks to System 2 humans have obtained the ‘freedom’ to engage in affairs and business that used to be insignificant and superfluous in nature. Only a few thousand years ago these functions were useless in the struggle for survival. One moment of day-dreaming turned a predator into a prey. This could be an explanation for the rather imperfect neural fit: the human brain appears not quite adequate for System 2. It’s functions are limited to the serial capacity of the working memory and related to the non-specific dimensions of general intelligence. System 2 functions like reflection, introspection and consciously remembering are time consuming and energy-wasting.

 

In the days of Sigmund Freud a distinction was made between the conscious and the unconscious. In later days psychologists devised other distinctions like intuitive versus analytical, implicit versus explicit, automatic versus deliberate, situational versus conceptual, associative versus systematic, compulsory versus accidental, or non-verbal versus verbal. It’s also tempting to match these distinctions with the experiencing and the reflecting/remembering self. Because of the rapid changing scientific paradigms in social science today all these distinctions are considered biased and ambiguous. This is the reason why the neutral terms System 1 and System 2 are used nowadays.

 

The smooth operating System 1 is almost uninterruptedly active and mostly it is in control. Consequently most of the time our consciousness simply appears to be confronted with (just a fraction of) the results of the underlying  unconscious processes.

By the time little children attend the kindergarten, System 1 is already in advanced operation. It’s just at the age of seven that System 2 starts to develop and from that time it needs about another fifteen years of maturing. By the time it is in full operation the years of amazement have been left behind. Cognition based on solely System 1 has become impossible. In the background System 2 acts as a chatterbox. It completes the fragments of experienced reality with associated elements of the autobiographical memory. The older on gets, the more chattering, the lesser one experiences by senses.

 

From time to time System 2 tries to be in charge, each time for a limited period. This takes a lot of effort and concentration and System 2 is frequently interrupted by emotions and associations of System 1. Until the old age System 2 is trying to do its best, but as the neural wiring of the cortex is gradually deteriorating, System 2 gets weary and is gradually going to expire. ‘Unless you change and become like little children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven’.

 

Because of the key role of System 1 in human thinking, neuroscientists have raised the serious question whether the initial ‘self’, that purposefully serves as the source of emotional, mental and behavioural activity, really exists. Or is it the result of conditioning or suggestion?

In the physical human brain no specific control centre has been found nor a throne where the soul is seated. There is neither an ‘inner eye’ located, nor a ‘Cartesian theatre’. ‘The thing about brains is that when you look in them, you discover that there’s nobody home.’ (Dennett, 1991)

 

There are sceptical scientists who stress that there is no neural correlate of the subject and therefore the free will must be considered as a mere illusion. The brain is functioning autonomously and from a materialistic point of view it’s better to consider the ‘self’ as just a spectator who is mistakenly believing to be in control. The self is not controlling the brain; it appears to be the other way around: the brain is controlling a suggestion of the self.

There are several possible objections against this sceptical view. First of all everyday life experience defies such reasoning. ‘The experience of free will is very compelling, and even those of us who think it is an illusion find that we cannot in practice act on the presupposition that it is an illusion. On the contrary, we have to act on the presupposition of freedom. […] We cannot think away our free will.’ (Searle, 2008)

 

Secondly, there is no philosophical ground for the abolishment of rational autonomy. Science originates from human reason and not vice versa. And it is only through the mediation of the human reason that scientists can reflect on nature. In other words, science itself has no self-legitimation. Indeed, the only legitimation of science originates from reason.

By denying the existence of a free will and the opportunity to act in a rational way, scientists who want to understand the social and psychological reality adequately, deprive themselves from the necessary rational means for investigation. Through the ages this has been pointed out by several philosophers. One of the most startling accounts is one by Arthur Schopenhauer.[3]  

 

As stated before, human System 1 originates from animal life and it has been strongly empowered and reinforced by critical surviving experiences during the evolutionary period of living in hominid groups and small hierarchical human societies and tribes. Much of our automated behaviour reflects the ancient way of living. Recently, with the rise of System 2, man has got a precarious opportunity to transcend natural necessity – at least in thinking, fantasising, designing and creating.

System 2 can deal with plans, regulations, structures, principles, standards, laws, organisations, etcetera. That’s why System 2 is flourishing in think-tanks and in front of drawing-boards. But not for a long time. Soon it gets tired and bored. When practice is no longer free and optional System 1 silently regains control. Especially when passions are at stake, the takeover is abrupt. Then the more crude and compulsive chemicals take possession of the mind.

Besides that many results of System 2 are feather light. They float like balloons. ‘Abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian’ (Hume, 1777).

 

When we (or should I say: our Systems 2) compare two distinct hominid species – chimpanzee and man – we see both a very small and very large variation. Genetically both species are real narrowly related. They both are social animals. Their similar instincts and unconscious habits indicate shared features of System 1. Especially in hard and unpredictable circumstances they both show similar reflexes. The big difference between the species has to do with System 2. Both versions are startling new in evolution, they are fragile and precarious. Compared to the chimp’s version the human one is just slightly more articulated. The effect though of this minuscule difference in earthly practice is gigantic. The human version has changed the planet completely.

With respect to the material side of life, the change of the planet within a few thousand years human culture resembles the million years aftermath of a massive asteroid impact. Moreover there is another impactful but nearly invisible explosion: the rise of an abundant and heavy mental life: ideas, beliefs, religion, superstition, science, dogmas, expectations, fame, regrets, fear, and sorrows. Now who is free? Man, who is free from natural necessity? Or the chimp, who remains free from the burden of heavy thinking?

 

Anyhow, in social and political life – and especially with respect to ethics – the changes have been much less pronounced. In these areas System 1 is decisively dominant. When it comes to the core mechanisms, human politics is not differing much from chimpanzee politics.  When it comes to the core mechanisms, human politics is not differing much from chimpanzee politics.

Chimpanzees don’t maintain formalised relationships based on authority, but to a large extent their mutual relationships are based on power. Stressing the group hierarchy has a priority. For the stability within the group it has priority number one. ‘As long as individuals have consistent preferences, they suppress negative emotions. But as soon as this consistency has disappeared, tensions are emerging’, according to primatologist Frans de Waal (2006).

 

In human society the social animal walks around in jeans and a trendy fleece sweater. Compared to primates man has a bit more leeway. We deal a little with self-determination and we are keeping up our self-image of the civilized man. But just like chimpanzees we put a lot of energy in relationships. And this is not for leisure. In the company of others we have a strong and compelling preference for human interest, entertaining anecdotes, instant intellectual tour de forces, lip services and fresh aftershave – all decent ways to deflea each other. We glorify the one and we jeer at the other, we connive and gossip and we tease a little. In a frisky way we convulsively try to stress the current hierarchy or to adapt it a little in our own advantage.

 

But even for humans there is a limit. In case of overt criticism or too explicit arrangements, we’ve crossed a line. We have sinned against the current hierarchy and the basic group interest. All of a sudden reason is overruled by the passions. Expulsion is next to the door.

For social animals expulsion is fatal. Without the protection of the group, one cannot survive. Threatening with such a fate – even only hinting at it – causes panic and fluid excrements. We may be modern citizens, driving Audi or BMW and wearing contemporary chalk stripe suits, we still are controlled by ancient reflexes that easily prevent us from being free and rational.

Niccolo Machiavelli (1513) did understand this. ‘It is necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. […] A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage everyone from offering advice unless he asks it.’

 

All in all, human beings are rather seldom behaving as rational agents, free from social and psychological necessity. We are no Econs, only pursuing our own interests. We’re simply Humans – mostly benevolent, sometimes malicious, sometimes rational, mostly irrational and susceptible to bad decisions and faulty choices.

Generally System 1 appears predominantly active when we buy fast food, cigarettes or toxic financial assets. And generally System 2 is active when we perceptively design smart Big Mac commercials that appeal to System 1, when we deliberately hold back compromising research results that demonstrate how harmful smoking is or when we invent financial assets with a toxicity that only can be tracked down by experts, but in no way by ingenuous customers.

 

Who, in these cases, are free to choose? Those who are buying them and indirectly happen to choose for obesity, lung cancer or financial debts? Or those who sell, design and invent them? According to Kant none of them is free.

But according to hard core libertarians, who tend to deny human nature and the natural role of System 1 in economic life, we all ought to be Econs. According to their ideology human irrational thinking has to be considered as a condemnable human weakness. Being a Human is blameworthy. On the other hand selfishness and greed are righteous, as well as deliberately profiting the susceptibility for irrational thinking of others.

 

For Humans individual freedom cannot do without some kind of protection – protection against deliberate mistreatment by Econs and against non-human ideologies. Of course the best protection is education, enforcement and emancipation – learning to see through the Human’s natural irrationality, to the inclination to rationally misuse it and to learn to deal with this. This is a government role, but not exclusively. In society we cannot do without consumer organisations, interest agencies and especially not without individuals who are nudging each other and provide for regular rational wake-up calls. This is paternalism in the good sense of the word.

 


 

[1]

Priming

F.i. test subjects who are primed with rude words were more likely to interrupt an investigator than those primed with neutral words. Test subjects primed with polite words were the least likely to interrupt (Bargh e.a., 1996).

WYSIATI

What you see is all there is

Narrow framing

One is suffering from narrow framing when making choices or decisions in a specific situation without considering sufficiently the context of the situation.

The inside view

In performing a job people who are orientated and concentrating on their task appear to forget viewing their task from an outside view. In some situations this outside view is even non-existent for them.

Preferences reversal

Preferences concerning a joint evaluation (of bets, bargains or matters of justice) may give different – and  sometimes opposite – outcomes than preferences concerning the separate evaluations.

 

[2] For the terms ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ see Stanovich & West (2000)

[3] ‘Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would all at once become aware that its final result—knowledge, which it reached so laboriously, was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting-point, mere matter; and when we imagined that we thought matter, we really thought only the subject that perceives matter; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it. Thus the tremendous petitio principii reveals itself unexpectedly; for suddenly the last link is seen to be the starting-point, the chain a circle, and the materialist is like Baron Münchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs, and himself also by his cue.’ (Schopenhauer, 1818 )